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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATe OF UTAH

ROBERT L. McMULLIN,
Appellant and Plaintiff,

I
Case No.

vs.

8998
LYNWOOD F. SHIMMIN and
JACQUIE A. SHIMMIN,

)

Respondents and Defendants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff's statement of facts in his brief is substantially
correct. However, exception is taken to the last sentence of
these facts wherein reference is made to the trial court's ruling.
The court's ruling was that the plaintiff was not entitled to
maintain an action for specific performance where he had sold
and conveyed away the property and was therefore unable to
specifically perform himself.
3
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE. Plaintiff cannot enforce specific performance of a contract to sell land where subsequent to the contract's execution he sold and conveyed all the property covered
by the contract to a third party.
POINT TWO. Plaintiff is barred after conveying the
property to a third party from recovering damages as an incident to the equitable action of specific performance.
POINT THREE. Plaintiff having retained the earnest
money is barred from recovery in an action at law for damages.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
PLAINTIFF CANNOT ENFORCE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A CONTRACT TO SELL LAND WHERE
SUBSEQUENT TO THE CONTRACT'S EXECUTION HE
SOLD AND CONVEYED ALL THE PROPERTY COVERED BY THE CONTRACT TO A THIRD PARTY.
The law is clear and unequivocable that the vendor of land
cannot maintain an action of specific performance to compel
the vendee to perform the purchase of said land where the
vendor has sold or conveyed the property to a third party.

" * * * it has been repeatedly held that a vendor
cannot enforce specific performance, where subsequent
to the execution of the contract he has conveyed a
4
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substantial part of the property therein embraced to
a third person.''
Suburban Improv. Co. v.
Scott Lumber Co., 4th Cir., 1933,
67 F. 2d 335, 90 A.L.R. 330
Additional cases citing this proposition of law are found
in the following annotations: 4 A.L.R. 408, 57 A.L.R. 1253,
1263, 90 A.L.R. 337. The recent case of First National Bank
vs. Laperle, 117 Vt. 144, 86 A. 2d 635, 30 A.L.R. 2d 958,
clearly summarized the law when the court ruled:
"A decree for specific performance in favor of a
vendor in a land contract cannot properly be granted
after full conveyance of the premises in question."
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Foxley v. Rich,
35 U. 162, 99 P. 666, ruled that plaintiff's conduct of selling
the property prior to the rendition of the decree for specific
performance would constitute a repudiation of the contract by
the plaintiff and therefore he would be precluded from maintaining an action for specific performance. The court said,
inter alia, at page 670.
"But the true principle upon which the decisions rest
is that the effect that such a conveyance will be given
depends upon the intention of the parties, and upon
whether the title is in fact placed beyond the control
of the vendor so his acts amount to a repudiation of his
contract. If such is the effect, the vendee need not
perform."
The facts in the case now before the court show that the
land in question was sold and conveyed by the plaintiff to
third parties after the commencement of the action, but months
before the pre-trial on November 7, 1958. R. 13, R. 22. The
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record further shows that the consideration paid by the new
purchasers was in excess of the amount that the defendants
were to pay for the same property.
"Specific enforcement will not be decreed if the
plaintiff has himself committed a material breach unless refusal of the decree will effectuate an unjust
penalty or forfeiture."
Restatement of Law, Contracts, Sec. 375
The plaintiff, having received a greater amount from the
new purchasers than he would have from the defendants, cannot be heard to say that the refusal to grant the decree will
effectuate an unjust penalty or forfeiture.

POINT TWO
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED AFTER CONVEYING THE
PROPERTY TO A THIRD PARTY FROM RECOVERING
DAMAGES AS AN INCIDENT TO THE EQUITABLE ACTION OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Under the common law, specific performance being an
equitable action precluded the equity court from awarding
damages as an incident to an action for specific performance.
However, this situation was changed by the passage in England
of what is known as the "Lord Cairn's Act." (Chancery Amendment Act, 21 and 22 Veit., Ch. 27, Sec. 1). The application
of this act has lead to an equity court awarding damages in an
action for specific performance as an ·adjunct to or in lieu of
a decree of enforcement, thereby giving complete adjudication
6
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in one action. The law as practiced today has generally allowed
the inclusion of a prayer for damages as an alternative to
specific performance in an action in equity for specific performance.
However, as stated in 49 Am. Jur. 196, Specific Performance, Sec. 17 3:
"The awarding of damages by a court of equity in
a suit for specific performance in lieu of a decree of
performance is exceptional, for the very reason that
jurisdiction of such suit depends
the essential fact
that a judgment at law for damages would not be an
adequate remedy, and jurisdiction to award damages
is exercised only under special circumstances, to prevent
injustice."

on

A plaintiff, in making an election to sue for specific performance instead of an action at law for damages, must of
necessity proceed through the equitable action with clean hands.
Pomeroy, in his work, "Specific Performance of Contracts,"
3rd Ed., Sec. 354, p. 762, states:

" * * * the plaintiff must perform all the terms on
his part, and that the party coming into a court of
equity for its relief must himself do equity."
If the plaintiff has made specific performance impossible
due to his own actions, the equity court cannot then accord
that plaintiff equitable relief or any relief which arises out of
the equitable action.
"Ordinarily, a bill for specific performance will not
be retained for the assessment of damage where the
plaintiff fails to make out a case for specific perform7
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ance and no other special equity is shown which will
support jurisdiction of the court * * * "
49 Am. Jur. 196
Specific Performance, Sec. 173
The law is clear that where the plaintiff knows at the
time of bringing the action that specific performance is impossible, there can be no award of damages, but the plaintiff
will be left to his remedy at law. Pomeroy's Specific Performance of Contracts, 3rd Ed., Sec. 475, pp. 957, 958.
So, too, where the plaintiff, after the commencement of
the action, has voluntarily done an act which makes specific
performance impossible, through no fault of the defendant,
the plaintiff is precluded from continuing on his action for
specific performance. He must then either dismiss his action
and start anew or amend his pleadings in conformity with
the rules on civil procedure to sue in an action at law for
damages.
There is nothing under the rules of civil procedure which
would preclude the plaintiff from amending his pleadings.
However, his failure to amend and his affirmative stand on
his pleadings, then constitutes an election, upon which election
the plaintiff is then bound by any subsequent rulings of the
court.
An examination of plaintiff's pleadings reveals that the
plaintiff proceeded in this action on one theory and only one
theory, that of specific performance. Rule 8 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure allows a plaintiff to state inconsistent
claims or counts in his complaint and the wfiole intent of the
Rules is to allow free amendment of pleadings. However,
8
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where plaintiff chooses to stand on his pleadings, then an
election of remedies occurs and the plaintiff is bound by this
decision.
The plaintiff cites the Utah case of Salt Lake City vs.
Industrial Commission, 81 U. 203, 17 P. 2d 239, in support
of his contention that he has not made an election of remedies.
The Supreme Court, in that case, ruled:
"While there is some conflict in the adjudicated
cases as to the effect of the mere commencement of an
action, the authorities are quite general! y agreed that
it is the first decisive act of election that is binding and
that subsequent acts may not be said to constitute an
election."
In a Utah case which is factually more closely allied to
the case now before the court than the Salt Lake City case,
the Supreme Court held:
"The true rule seems to be ( 1) that there must be,
in fact, two or more coexisting remedies upon which
the party has the right to elect; ( 2) the remedies thus
open to him must be alternative and inconsistent; and
(3) he must be actually bringing an action or by some
other decisive act, with knowledge of the facts, indicate his choice between these inconsistent remedies.
20 C. J. 19-37 and cases there cited. With such elements present, an election once deliberately made by
the institution of a suit, by which the remedy is sought
to be recovered, is final and his failure to secure satisfaction by means of the remedy which he has adopted
furnishes no legal reason to permit him to resort to the
other." (Citing cases) .
Cook vs. Covey-Ballard Motor Co.
69 U. 161, 253 P. 196

9
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Additional Utah cases on election appear in the annotation
in 6 A.L.R. 2d 80.
The record discloses that plaintiff did not in fact attempt
to amend his pleadings up to and including the date of the
hearing on his motion to alter judgment. This failure constitutes an election to stand on the equitable action. Plaintiff
did this because of the ruling of the court in the Andreasen
vs. Hansen Case, ____ U. ____ , 335 P. 2d 404, which ruling bars
the plaintiff from maintaining an action for damages because
of his failure to tender back the earnest money to the defendants. The plaintiff seeks to maintain his equitable action for
specific performance and obtain damages in lieu of enforcement of the contract, and thereby go around the Andreasen
case. However, as stated above, the law is that where the
plaintiff has, through his own conduct, made specific performance impossible, the action will not be retained by the courts
for as~essment of damages which the plaintiff may have suffered.
"Pursuant to the principle that a court of equity
once having properly acquired jurisdiction in a suit for
specific performance will make a complete adjudication
of all matters properly presented and involved in the
case, the court will in proper cases where, through no
fault of the plaintiff, specific performance cannot or
will not be decreed, grant, in lieu thereof, monetary
damages which the plaintiff may be entitled to recover
at law in an action for breach of contract."
49 Am. Jur., 195, Specific Performance, 172

(Emphasis ours)
49 Am. Jur. 197, Specific Performance, Sec. 173, states:
"Even when the plaintiff has made out a proper case
10
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for the retention of his bill and the awarding of damages in lieu of a specific performance, the court will
not grant that substituted remedy unless it is requested,
or unless damages are claimed."
While it is true that plaintiff in his prayer for relief did
request damages, in the body of the complaint itself there are
no allegations of any special damages as required by Rule 9 (g)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
"Special Damage. When items of special damages
are claimed, they shall be specifically stated."
The only damages alleged by plaintiff in his complaint
is for a reasonable- attorney's fee. As ruled by this court in the
ilndreasen case:
"The award of attorney's fees is conditioned upon the
necessity for incurring them and upon the plaintiffs
being justified in their demands."
In the case now before the court, the plaintiff's conduct
in selling the property to a third party is evidence of the fact
that the action for specific performance was not necessary,
and that the incurring of attorney's fees for the purpose of
commencing an action of specific performance was completely
unnecessary.
Further, the damages asked for in plaintiff's prayer for
relief, "that plaintiff have judgment against defendants for
the difference between the contract price and the fair market
value of the property," limits the amount of damages that
the plaintiff could recover, as the court cannot go beyond
plaintiff's demands and award greater damages, especially
where the plaintiff at no time attempted to amend his pleadings to incorporate claims of greater damage.
11
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What, then, is the amount of the damage that the court
could award? The contract price of the propery was $17,500.00.
The property was sold by plaintiff for $17,950.00. This court,
in the recent decision of V rontikis Bros. et al vs. State Tax
Commission, ruled:
"The accepted formula for determining fair market
value is * * * what would a purchaser willing to buy
but not required to do so, pay and what would a seller
willing to sell but not required to do so ask.''
Certainly, the plaintiff cannot say that he was under any
compulsion to sell this property, and, as a third party bought
the property, as a matter of law it may be said that the fair
market value of the proprety in question was $17,950.00.
What, then, has the plaintiff suffered? There was no need
to retain the services of an attorney for an action of specific
performance, when the plaintiff's conduct points out that he
never did have the intention of enforcing specific performance
,against the defendants, and, as to damages, the plaintiff
received $450.00 more for his property than he would have
received had he sold it to the defendants.

POINT THREE
PLAINTIFF HAVING RETAINED THE EARNEST
MONEY IS BARRED FROM RECOVERY IN AN ACTION
AT LAW FOR DAMAGES.
The case now before the court stems from a factual situation similar to the Andreasen vs. Hansen case. The same earnest
money receipt and offer to purchase used in the Andreasen

12
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case was used in this matter and the same representations that
if the purchasers did not want the house the money paid would
be forfeited and the matter closed. Like in the Andreasen
case, the plaintiff in this matter chose to retain the earnest
money ($100.00), and has never tendered its return to the
defendants. This retention constitutes the exercising of the
option by the vendor (plaintiff) to retain the earnest money
as the agreed and liquidated damages.
Plaintiff in his brief alleges that the trial court based
its decision on the Andreasen case. This is not borne out by
statement of the trial court made during the argument on the
motion to alter judgment.
"Well, the motion to alter the judgment will be
denied, and the ruling of the court on November 7
will be affirmed because it appears that the plaintiff has
put it beyond himself to specifically perform at this
time."
R. 23
The issue in this case is not whether or not plaintiff should
have tendered back the earnest money, because plaintiff has
not amended his pleadings to come in damages. The issue of
this case is whether or not plaintiff by having sold and conveyed the property is barred from maintaining his equitable
action on specific performance. Of course the Andreasen case
is in issue as far as its effect on the matter if the plaintiff had
amended his pleadings so as to come in damages, or if plaintiff's
actions can be construed to be an amendment of his pleadings.
If there has been an amendment effectuated, the pleadings and
record do not so indicate.

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SUMMARY

The plaintiff, by selling and conveying the property he
was seeking to compel the defendants to purchase by specific
performance of a contract, has precluded the court from decreeing specific performance or awarding damages in lieu
of the specific performance. The plaintiff is barred by having
retained the earnest money paid to him by the defendants from
maintaining an action at law for damages. The pleadings and
the record show that the plaintiff in any event has not been
injured in any way by the defendants, but in fact has profited
some $450.00 by the defendants' refusal to purchase the property. Plaintiff is not entitled to any relief and the trial court
was correct in dismissing plaintiff's complaint for specific
performance with prejudice.
Respectfully submitted,
COTRO-MANES & COTRO-MANES

Attorneys for Respondents
and Defendants
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